I remember coming across Nozick before as a cardboard libertarian philosopher. My impression of Anarchy, State and Utopia (“ASU”), its main arguments and weaknesses, were more or less consistent with what Dworkin mentioned in his Magee interview:
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Nozick starts from the proposition that individuals have rights and there are things no state may do to them without violating their rights. His arguments fail because this basic starting point is unjustified.
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Nozick argues the most a state can do is to be a night-watchman state; that any state that goes beyond this would be violating individuals’ rights. E.g. the Wilt Chamberlain argument, showing that any pattern enforced by the state will be quickly disrupted by individual choices.
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But his arguments fail because they are “all or nothing” arguments that fail to respond to the nuances of the situation. E.g. taxing Chamberlain once a year cannot be equated with meddling every time someone plays to watch him play basketball.
For this reason, despite reading (and loving) the famous Preface to ASU (where Nozick compares Philosophy with taking a snapshot of a jumble of furniture just at the right angle), I did not persist with the book.
It was only after I came across David Schmidtz’s My Dinner with Nozick from Leiter Reports that my interest was piqued again.
From the anecdote recounted by Schmidtz, it doesn’t seem that Nozick is really very interested in persuading anyone of anything at all. He simply wanted to explore unusual consequences from different seemingly attractive starting points.
On this re-reading of the ASU, I skipped to “Utopia”, then went back to the “Anarchy”, and ended with the “State”. My impression is entirely different and it now strikes me neither of the standard objections holds true.
“Individuals have rights and there are things no state may do to them (without violating their rights)”: this famous open gambit is never defended or meant to be defended. The reader can take it or leave it: if the premise doesn’t appeal, then there is not much point reading the rest of the book.
What Nozick seems is doing is simply exploring a number of interesting consequences that follow from this line of thought. If someone else suggests a different starting point, a different picture would emerge. But the fact that other starting points are possible and other reflections are available surely does not diminish the value and charm of ASU itself.
Similarly, the beginning of “State”, Nozick makes clear the whole argument only works assuming (1) there is a sound theory of how property rights are fairly acquired in the first place, and (2) there is a sound theory how property rights can fairly pass from one person to another. It is an open question whether either (1) or (2) is true.
The argument also only works if the proviso has limited application, i.e. the degree of unfairness in the initial acquisition of property only requires limited rectification by the state. Whether this is true or not, as Nozick correctly says, is a matter of historical assessment.
I myself do not think, as a matter of historical fact, property acquisition or transmission are fair (or can be made fair). A wide application of the proviso is therefore necessary, which would limit the practical application of Nozick’s argument.
But this does not affect the substance of Nozick’s argument itself. He simply says assuming (1) and (2), interesting consequences follow. E.g. end-state inequality can arise very organically and in a way that is very hard to suppress.
This line of argument changes the way one looks at inequality. So too, does Nozick’s intriguing analysis of equality and envy: how, if everyone indeed rises to the level of Beethoven and Goethe, people would likely find new things to envy about.
After all, long before I had any appreciation of Nozick, I was attracted to (and envious of?) Nozick’s stature. If every philosopher is as good as Nozick (and as famous), would I have got interested in reading Nozick at all? If everyone is just as good, would I want to read anyone?
Overall, Nozick does not seem intent to persuade anyone to “come over” to the libertarian angle. Instead, he is simply inviting us to come and look at some good things about it. In that limited but important task, it succeeds admirably.